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ABSTRACT
We present a chip architecture for a compressive sensing
based method that can be used in conjunction with the JTAG
standard to detect IC Trojans. The proposed architecture
compresses chip output resulting from a large number of test
vectors applied to a circuit under test (CUT). We describe our
designs in sensing leakage power, computing random linear
combinations under compressive sensing, and piggybacking
these new functionalities on JTAG. Our architecture achieves
approximately a 10× speedup and 1000× reduction in output
bandwidth while incurring a small area overhead.
Index Terms— Compressive sensing, IC Trojan, CS-
JTAG, measurement generator
1. INTRODUCTION
Fabless integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing has become
a mainstream trend today, as many companies choose to
outsource the manufacturing of their IC designs to wafer
foundries. While this outsourcing model may provide ad-
vantages in manufacturing cost and an access to advanced
fabrication facilities, there is an increasing concern about the
security of these externally manufactured chips. It is gener-
ally more difﬁcult to enforce security measures with external
manufacturers which are under separate management, and as
a result there is less assurance on these chips being free from
possible malicious attacks during the fabrication process.
A Trojan [1–3] is malicious circuitry implanted in, for
example, a CPU or encryption IC. Trojans may be a small
addition to a normal circuit and may remain dormant until
triggered by a special signal. During the incubation period
it could be especially difﬁcult to detect Trojans, given that
therewillbe nofunctionaldifferencebetweenTrojan-freeand
Trojan-embedded circuits.
In the literature, there are three basic premises studied for
a Trojan detector: a) timing of the circuit path could be slower
because of supplementary Trojan gates [4]; b) Trojan will in-
evitably draw some static power [5]; and c) physical structure
of the circuit is altered [6]. When the Trojan is not on the crit-
ical path, however, it is difﬁcult to notice the timing modiﬁca-
tion. And ﬁnding out the circuit alteration can be impractical
due to costly, destructive inspection. Therefore, detecting the
power consumption difference induced by a Trojan can rep-
resent an attractive alternative [7–11]. This approach belongs
to a class of detection methods called side channel analysis.
It is the approach this paper takes.
Ideally, a Trojan can be detected by observing the leakage
power difference between a circuit-under-test (CUT) and the
corresponding Trojan-free circuit. The total leakage power
of a circuit with the gate-level details can be modeled and
described statistically [11,12]. However, because of fabrica-
tion process variation [13,14], the leakage current distribution
varies from gate to gate even with the same input states. This
means that the Trojan power consumption could be hidden in
process variation.
To combat the issue of process variation, statistical meth-
ods, such as [11], involving a large number of test vectors
will be needed. In DISTROY [7], we have proposed an I/O-
efﬁcientmethodtodiscoverrevealingtestvectorsthatcandis-
tinguish a Trojan-embedded circuit from a Trojan-free circuit.
The approach relies on the assumption that such test vectors
are rare, i.e., they are sparse. Thus, by using compressive
sensing (CS) [15,16], which exploits signal sparsity, we can
efﬁciently ﬁnd the revealing test vectors from a large candi-
date pool (i.e., the test vector space) without incurring exces-
sive chip I/O.
In this paper we describe a chip architecture for a com-
pressive sensing based IC Trojan detection method under the
DISTROY framework [7]. We explore architecture issues for
various CS regularity conditions such as the restricted isom-
etry property (RIP) [17]. Our goal is to provide an IC design
house or a foundry with a realistic and low-cost Trojan detec-
tion infrastructure.
Our architecture leverages the commonly used Joint Test
Action Group (JTAG) boundary scan standard [18]. We there-
forenamethisarchitecturecompressivesensing-JTAG,orCS-
JTAG. CS-JTAG provides not only the original function of
JTAG but also compressive encoding capabilities for efﬁcient
detection of possible malicious implants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We explainCircuit Under Test 
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Fig. 1. Chip architecture for CS-based IC-Trojan detection.
the CS-based Trojan detection in Sec. 2. Sec. 3 presents the
proposed chip architecture. We discuss our design in Sec. 4
andevaluate the performance of our implementation in Sec. 5.
Sec. 6 concludes the paper.
2. COMPRESSIVE SENSING BASED TROJAN
DETECTION
2.1. Compressive Sensing (CS) Fundamentals
Compressive sensing [15,16,19] is a new signal processing
paradigm that can acquire a sparse signal representation with
linear random projections. It allows encoding a signal with
sparsity constraints and recovering the signal with only few
compressed measurements. More precisely, supposed that we
can represent a signal x, an N ×1 vector, as a sparse approx-
imation using a basis 	:
x ≈
K ∑
i=1
siψi = 	s (1)
where the ψi are basis functions, with K ≪ N. Then x is
said K-sparse and compressible. CS encoding computes an
M × 1 measurement y of compressive measurements, each
random linear combination of K-sparse x using an M × N
measurement matrix :
y = x (2)
Matrix  is also called a sensing matrix. It has randomly
chosen entries. To reconstruct the signal x from y, we use
an underdetermined linear system given by Eq. 3 where there
are more unknowns (N) than equations (M). The CS theory
states that the signal can be reconstructed, with M being as
small as cK log(N/K) for a small constant c, using ℓ1-norm
minimization:
min∥s∥ℓ1 s.t. y = 	
 1
s (3)
Note that a number of optimization algorithms can be used
such as compressive sampling matching pursuit (CoSaMP)
and iterative soft-thresholding (IST). The CS theory shows
that more measurements result in more accurate recovery.
2.2. CS-based Trojan Detection Approach
Our proposed CS-based approach (Fig. 1) reduces I/O band-
width requirement while maintaining the same testing qual-
ity. First, we avoid inputting test vectors by generating them
on-chip. Second, chip output is reduced from N power mea-
surements to M random linear combinations of these mea-
surements, where M ≪ N. The off-chip Trojan detector
then recovers the most signiﬁcant power variations from the
M power measurements.
An on-chip test vector generator (TVG) generates N test
vectors, v1,v2,...,vN that are applied to the CUT. The corre-
sponding N leakage power measurements, xc1,xc2,...,xcN
(xC) are then compressed into M linear combinations,
yc1,...,ycM (yC), on-the-ﬂy through multiplication by a
sensing matrix . The simulation reference (”gold” mea-
surement), xG is also multiplied by the same  to get yG.
We perform CS reconstruction of xC−xG off-chip based
on yC−yG. Since the vector xC−xG is expected to be
sparse, therequirednumberofmeasurementsM canbesmall.
BasedontherecoveredxC−xG, statisticalanalysisproposed
in [7] is then applied to examine suspicious chips and make
the ﬁnal decision about whether or not the CUT is deemed
to be Trojan-embedded. Note that CS reconstruction can be
performed off-chip with highly parallel computing platform
such as GPU. In this paper, we focus on the on-chip sensing
architecture.
3. CS-JTAG ARCHITECTURE
Our chip architecture aims at providing an automatic self-
examination scheme for discovering malicious Trojans with-
out complicated interfaces. As shown in Fig. 2, the on-chip
detecting architecture includes a TVG, a leakage power sen-
sor (LPS), a measurement generator (MG), and the CS-JTAG
controller governing the original JTAG controller. Except
LPS which is analog, all the other circuits are digital. The
following subsections describe the data ﬂow and major mod-
ules in detail.
3.1. Data Flow and Schedule
Fig. 3 depicts the data ﬂow and work scheduling of the archi-
tecture. The TVG applies each test pattern, vi, to the CUT per
clock cycle. After the CUT settles down, the LPS measures
each leakage power sample, xci, corresponding to its test pat-
tern. The MG performs matrix-vector multiplication to form
compressed measurements yci while receiving xci. Note that
all yci are produced at the same time after the last leakage
power data xcN is received. Each yci is outputted afterwards.
3.2. CS-JTAG Controller
The JTAG standard was originally developed for boundary
scan and internal device tests during chip production. Fig. 4CUT
J
T
A
G
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
CS-JTAG Controller
Leakage 
Power 
Sensor
Measurement 
Generator
Tap Buffer
Test Vector Generator
Analog circuit
Digital circuit
xci
yci
CS-JTAG
Fig. 2. On-chip Trojan detection architecture.
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Fig. 3. Data ﬂow and work scheduling.
depicts the original JTAG controller and how it interfaces to
our CS-JTAG controller. There are three input ports to con-
trol JTAG controller: clock decides the debug operating fre-
quency, enable controls the state transition of output control
signals, and input allows the user to insert the test vector and
the expected result one bit per cycle. The JTAG operating
stage can be divided into three steps, get, shift, and set.
Each step individually manages the register scan chain around
the CUT to get the output data, shift the test vector along the
scan chain, and update the input register buffers.
Similarly, our proposed architecture is also a three-step
process, parallel test vector insertion, leakage power sens-
ing, and measurement generation. It implies that the JTAG
ports can be used as a chip infrastructure for our Trojan-
detection purposes. To this end, CS-JTAG manipulates a new
Trojan enable signal to control the state transition of the
JTAG. The consequent JTAG output control signals then are
utilized to control the three new modules. As a result, no
additional port is needed for the CS-JTAG architecture and
the CS-JTAG controller is simpliﬁed to merely enable the
JTAG controller to support CS related operations.
3.3. Leakage Power Sensor
Since ICs typically operate at a ﬁxed voltage, we can refer
to leakage current Io and leakage power PL interchangeably.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, we duplicate the circuit current by a
current mirror to make I′ = Io. By ﬁxing the resistance R,
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the voltage drop V+ − V− can be represented as in Eq. 4.
V+ − V− = I′ · R = Io · R (4)
PL = V DD · Io = V DD ·
V+−V 
R (5)
An analog-to-digital converter (ADC) is applied in LPS to
calculate the voltage drop, as suggested by [20]. After know-
ing V+ − V−, the circuit leakage power can be determined as
depicted in Eq. 5. For calculating PL of each test vector, the
ADC is needed to be fast enough to provide power results in
every cycle. However, the leakage current is usually too small
to drive ADC. An opamp A is designed to increase the current
driving capability and accelerate power settling time.
3.4. Measurement Generator
The measurement generator comprises circular shift registers
(CSRs), linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs), and selective
adders (Fig. 6). The compressed measurement yci is com-
puted in a shift and accumulate manner, using a Bernoulli
sensing matrix with coefﬁcients ϕij∈{+1,−1}. The original
leakage power data is sparse in time domain and the Bernoulli
sensing matrix is incoherent with our representative basis.
Note that each yci is the inner product of a row vector in
 and xC. That is, yc1 = ϕ11xc1 + ϕ12xc2 + ... + ϕ1NxcN,
yc2 = ϕ21xc1+ϕ22xc2+...+ϕ2NxcN and so on. The partial+
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Fig. 6. Measurement generator (MG).
sum of yci is updated when receiving a new xci. LFSRs are
used to generate selection bits for summand (i.e., xci or −xci)
multiplexers. The current selected summands are added to the
corresponding accumulated partial sums circularly shifted to
the selective adders. After computing all M measurements,
MG sequentially outputs the results stored in the CSRs.
4. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
4.1. Operating Frequency Aspects
We denote the sampling frequency of LPS by fLPS, and the
operating frequency of MG, CUT by fMG, fCUT respec-
tively. To measure stable power data, the fLPS should not
be smaller than fCUT. For instance, if fCUT is 100 MHz,
fLPS should be at least 100M samples/s. We denote the max-
imum fCUT by fCUTmax and consider the following cases.
•HighcapabilityLPS,fLPS  fCUTmax. Inthiscase, the
CS-JTAG achieves maximum throughput and shortest latency
for generating yci, provided that fMG ≥ fLPS. Given that
the testing cannot be performed faster than fCUTmax, there is
no need to design fLPS to be larger.
• Low capability LPS, fLPS < fCUTmax. The CS-JTAG
bottleneck is determined by fLPS.
Note that the design constraint fMG ≥ fCUT holds in
both cases. However, the area-efﬁciency may increase by se-
lecting a higher fMG (discussed in 4.2). Depending on the
target testing frequency and throughput requirement, we then
design the architecture with suitable fLPS and fMG.
4.2. Area Aspects
The most area-intensive part lies in MG (Fig. 6). Thus it is
signiﬁcant to reduce the area of MG. Here deﬁnes a frequency
ratio r = ⌊fMG/fLPS⌋ and a parallelism ratio h = ⌈M/r⌉.
After receiving a power data xci from LPS, MG has r clock
cyclestocalculateallM partialsumsuntilthenextxci comes.
In each cycle, MG calculates h partial sums in parallel (i.e.,
MG calculate partial sums of yc1∼ych at the ﬁrst clock cycle
and those of ych+1∼yc2h at the second, etc.). Thus, there are
total h CSRs, h LFSRs, and h selective adders in MG. Each
CSR consists of r registers. We now discuss three factors in-
ﬂuencing circuit area.
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Fig. 7. The Trojan-embedded circuit under test.
• Number of Measurements, M. MG requires M regis-
ters for buffering partial sums of compressed measurements.
Hence, the area cost is linearly proportional to M.
• Frequency Ratio, r. With M ﬁxed, low frequency ratio re-
sults in high parallelism of MG. This indicates more selective
adders and LFSRs are required.
• Bitwidth of Measurements, BW(yci). The bitwidth of
yci, deﬁned as BW(yci), directly affects the gate counts of
registers in MG. We can reduce BW(yci) but still maintain
compression quality. xci is ﬁrstly biased by a reference value
in the middle range of leakage power. Because the Bernoulli
random matrix has coefﬁcients in {+1,−1}, we then reduce
BW(yci) depending on the coefﬁcient distribution.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
5.1. Circuit Under Test with Embedded Trojan
As a test circuit for CS-JTAG, we designed an encryption
circuit (Fig. 7) including an deliberately-inserted Trojan for
performance evaluation purposes. The circuit uses a LFSR
to generate pseudo random number for an XOR-based ci-
pherandproducesthecorrespondingcyclicredundancycheck
code. The Trojan is activated while triggered by a speciﬁc
input pattern. It then changes the seed and load control of
the pseudo random number generator, resulting in an unreli-
able cipher. The Trojan-free circuit can be obtained directly
by removing the Trojan part and connecting the correspond-
ing ports. In the simulation, we set the 64-bits seed to be a
constant and use exhaustive (N=216) test vectors for 16-bits
data input. The maximum testing frequency fCUTmax is as-
sumed to be 200MHz. All circuits, including CS-JTAG and
circuit under test, are synthesized and simulated in 90nm gen-
eral purpose process.
5.2. Synthesis Results
Fig. 8 shows the synthesis results of area-speed trade-off un-
der various design factors. We can reduce area cost by either
choosing a smaller M or a lower fLPS.Frequency Ratio (r = 200MHz/fLPS)
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Without CS, the output time dominates the system per-
formance. It requires about 3.27 ms to ﬁnish testing all 216
vectors if fLPS=fMG=200MHz. With CS, the testing time
is reduced to 0.33 ms, implying about 10× speedup. Note
that as fLPS is extremely slow, power sensing time becomes
critical and there is no gain by adopting CS.
Fig. 9 shows the output bandwidth reduction ratio. When
yci is 26-bits and M is 32, the proposed approach achieves
about 780× improvement against the baseline approach. The
improvement is even higher if yci is 16-bits and M is 8. Be-
sides, it results in about 22% area reduction of MG while the
bitwidth of yci is reduced from 26 bits to 16 bits.
5.3. Simulation Results
In the CS-based Trojan detection scheme, we only need to
ﬁnd the most revealing vectors. With its the largest-ﬁrst de-
coding property, CS decodes the largest abnormal power con-
sumption values ﬁrst. In our design experiments, we set spar-
sity K to be less than 8, M to 64, N to 216, and yci to 16
bits. fLPS is set to 200MHz. Note that the system should
follow M=cK log(N/K) constraint to have correct recon-
structions. The total area cost of CS-JTAG is about 32K at
200MHz. The Trojan-embedded circuit is about 2K gates
with Trojan being approximately 0.18K gates (about 8% of
the total area of the CUT). We then perform gate-level cir-
cuit power analysis using simulation CAD tools given this
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design speciﬁcation. We show the leakage power distribution
for the Trojan-embedded circuit and the Trojan-free circuit,
respectively, under process variation. Note that here we only
illustrate leakage power values for 1024 consecutive test vec-
tors (Fig. 10). The proposed architecture is further adopted
to encode the sensed power data of CUT on-line into com-
pressed measurements. By applying our previous work, DIS-
TROY [7], the compressed measurements are off-line decoded
todiscoverseveralvectorsthatcanseparatetheleakagepower
distribution of the Trojan-free circuit from that of the Trojan-
embedded circuit. Therefore, the statistical analysis in DIS-
TROY can then determine the false positive rate and the de-
tection rate for detection decisions. In the future, we plan
to verify the proposed architecture and the testing procedure
through the hardware implementation.
6. CONCLUSION
Compressive sensing based detection of IC Trojans is capa-
ble of identifying test vectors which reveal Trojans, without
subjecting to excessive amounts of chip I/O. In this paper, we
have shown a chip architecture to realize the required chip
functionalities such as sensing of leakage power and comput-
ing of random projections. In addition, we have shown an
approach leveraging the existing JTAG architecture. Based
on these results, we conclude that chip realization of com-
pressive sensing based IC Trojans detection is feasible.
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